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Legal Services in the Doha Round 
Sydney M. CONE III* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As a subcategory of professional services and a sub-subcategory of business 
services, legal services, when supplied transnationally, are the subject of negotiation in 
the current round of multilateral trade negotiations known as the Doha Round. 
Although this is the first round to be held under the aegis of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), as distinguished from its predecessor, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), it is the second round of multilateral trade negotiations 
to involve services generally and legal services in particular. The Uruguay Round 
(1987-1993), under the aegis of the GATT, created not only the WTO but also the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 1 Both the WTO and the GATS 
came into effect on 1 January 1995, and the latter, upon corning into effect, contained 
specific commitments and other provisions relating to legal services-as well as other 
categories of services-that had been negotiated and agreed to during the Uruguay 
Round by countries that became WTO Members. 
Because, in terms of economic magnitude and political heft, legal services, 
relatively, have not figured prominently under the GATS, they are not expected to 
be a major factor in the Doha Round. Moreover, that round is not expected to be 
concluded for some time, and past experience suggests that legal services will figure 
only in an ancillary fashion in the overall process of negotiation-of tough 
bargaining over a complex and wide variety of goods, services, intellectual 
* C.V. Starr Professor of Law, New York Law School; Senior Counsel, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton. 
1 The Doha Round was undertaken by WTO Members pursuant to a Ministerial Declaration adopted on 
14 November 2001 at a Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, WT/ MIN(Ol)/DEC/1 (20 November 2001). 
The GATS is Annex lB to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization as signed on 15 April 
1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco. Specific commitments and exemptions from most-favoured-nation treatment 
relating to legal services are set out under (1) Horizontal Commitments and (2) Sector-Specific Commitments 
annexed as schedules to the GATS for the respective WTO Members. The Sector-Specific Commitments for 
Legal Services are found under "Professional Services'', which in turn are found under "Business Services". in 
the relevant schedules. Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex lb, vols 28-:-30 (Geneva: 
GATT Secretariat, 1994). The classification of services is found in WTO Services Sectoral Class1ficat1on List, 
Doc. MTN.GNS/ W /120. 
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property, and trade policies.2 Even so, the negotiations on legal services that take 
place in the Doha Round have considerable potential for affecting the economics 
and activities of lawyers and law firms, and for influencing the content of local 
professional rules governing the practice of law. This article will examine that 
potential. 
A key word in the preceding paragraph is "local". Legal services are rendered by 
practitioners acting as individual lawyers or, more frequently in the context relevant to 
this article, as members or employees of law firms. These practitioners are licensed by 
local authorities under local rules that have their genesis in local tradition and 
experience. Although concepts relating to international trade in legal services can be 
abstracted into. terminology and categories compatible with the GA TS-compatible, 
that is, with concepts derived from the jurisprudence of multilateral trade-the 
regulation of the legal professions of the world is, in reality,,intensely parochial. It is 
this parochialism that gives legal services a certain singularity i~ the Doha Round, and 
that must be understood at the outset before one can evaluate the potential of the 
Doha Round in respect of legal services. 
Indeed, as one considers the implications of parochialism for multilateral trade 
negotiations concerning legal services, one at some point will almost inevitably ask 
oneself, is it useful to include legal services in the Doha Round? After all, a round of 
WTO-sponsored negotiations is aimed not so much at the particularized governance 
of diverse legal professions as at commercial products which, whatever their source, 
are by their very nature rather fungible and free from heterodoxy. Thus, a 
companion question arises: Are there not, for legal services, useful alternatives to an 
undertaking such as the Doha Round? This article will examine both sides of these 
questions, and will suggest that (notwithstanding the force of certain arguments to 
the contrary) the Uruguay Round, for better or for worse, may already have 
prejudged the answer. That is, legal services having already been included in that 
'i:ound as a (sub-sub-) category under the GATS, to decide now to exclude legal 
services from the Doha negotiations could, at a minimum, create an appearance of 
retrogression and protectionism unhelpful to the cross-border practice of law-
unhelpful, that is, to lawyers and law firms engaged in that practice and, perhaps of 
even greater relevance, to their clients. 
2 According to the WTO, in 2000 the value of world exports of all commercial services was USS 1, 435 
billion, and the value of world exports of all merchandise was USS 6,186 billion. The WTO broke down these 
torals into major categories, but legal services do not constitute one of those major categories: <www.wto.org/ 
english/[-]res_e/statis_e/ its2001_e/ chp_ 4_e.pdf>. National data for legal services present a special problem 
because the data (a) do not distinguish between legal services (i) performed in a home country for the benefit of 
clients in other countries and (ii) performed in host-country establishments, and (b) probably also do not 
distinguish between fees and reimbursed expenses. See Sydney M. Cone, III, International Trade in Legal Services 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1996), at 1: 19 (analysis oflegal-service data released by the US Deparonent of Commerce) _ 
(hereinafter "Cone 1996"). As discussed in this article, legal services performed in host-country establishments 
constitute the principal category of legal services at issue in the Doha Round. On the ancillary nature of legal 
services in the Uruguay Round, see Cone, as above, at 2:12-13, 2:42-44 (apparent rrade-off involving US legal 
services and Japanese semiconductors). 
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This article reaches this answer after examining a somewhat complicated 
landscape. 
. First, it asks which WTO Members are the major suppliers and users of legal 
services; in this connection, it will focus on the European Union and the 
United States, and their respective bilateral and multilateral interests. 
Next, it considers arguments involving the globalization of legal practice, and 
the interests of countries viewed, on the one hand, as the beneficiaries of, and, 
on the other hand, as the targets of, globalization. 
Third, it sets out and analyses the proposition that the Doha Round 
negotiations should abstract legal services into categories of professional 
arrangements, and should then attempt to foster agreements framed in terms 
of formal categories deemed susceptible of incorporation into schedules of 
GATS commitments. 
Fourth, it examines the possibility, under the GATS, of taking a lesser or 
parallel step known as developing multilateral professional disciplines, rather 
than seeking to negotiate full-blown agreements based on national schedules 
of specific commitments. 
Finally, on the basis of the review and analysis thus conducted, the article 
attempts to reach a balanced conclusion to the question: Is it helpful to include 
legal services in the Doha Round? 
II. MAJOR CROSS-BORDER SUPPLIERS AND USERS OF LEGAL SER VICES 
Legal services are included under the GATS (which, as its name indicates, is an 
agreement on trade in services) as though they were an item of trade being imported 
into and exported from WTO Member countries. 3 In the case of legal services, this 
concept is a sometimes confusing fiction, and in practice the fiction is often ignored. 
Instead, the practice that evolved in the Uruguay Round was for the essential 
negotiations on legal services to focus on rights of establishment (and rights ancillary 
thereto) that law firms seek and, where available, assert and implement outside their 
home countries. For this purpose, the relevant WTO Member countries are home 
members and host members. A law firm's home member is the country in which the 
firm is present, conducts a substantial and regular legal practice, and is treated by the 
firm itself as its home country. A host member in respect of that firm is any WTO 
Member country, other than the firm's home member, in which the firm establishes or 
.seeks to establish itself for the purpose of supplying legal services. Accordingly, in the 
area oflegal services, the Uruguay Round focused on the rights of home-member law 
firms to create establishments in host members, and to staff those establishments with 
lawyers from, among other places, the relevant home member. 
3 
_See, generally, Laurel Terry, CATS' Applicability to Transnational Lawyers and its Potential Impact on Domestic 
Regulation ef U.S. Lawyers, 34 Va!1derbilt J. Transnational L. (2001), 989; see Cone, as note 2 above, at 5-6. 
32 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 
The European Union and the United States are the leading WTO Members in 
terms both of supplying legal services through establishments in host members, and 
using legal services supplied by establishments oflaw firms from other home members.4 
That is, EU and US law firms are leaders in establishing themselves outside their home 
countries, and the European Union and the United States are leading centres of legal 
practice that include establishments of non-home-member law firms. In this sense 
(employing the fiction that legal services are imported and exported), it can be said that 
the European Union and the United States are leaders as· both importers and exporters 
of legal services. 
Cross-border legal practice is hardly confined to EU and US law firms. There are 
host-country establishments in many other WTO Members, of which China; Japan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore are notable examples. Moreover, countries such as 
Australia, Brazil and Canada are WTO home members. that both permit the 
establishment of law firms from other home members, and b-ave their own home-
member law firms whose operations include establishments in other host members.5 
As has been mentioned, the European Union and the United States are not only 
the leading host members, but also the leading home members; thus, they have legal-
service establishments in other host members, including, importantly, each other. One 
not surprising consequence of this comparability of the European Union and the 
United States is the existence of concessions that they would like to obtain from each 
other in the area of legal services. Given their predominance in this area, it might be 
thought that, as between themselves, the European Union and the United States 
would simply enter into bilateral negotiations with a view to agreeing on mutual 
concessions. Here, however, two critical factors must be taken into account, one 
involving domestic regulation of legal practice, the other involving the GA TS, each 
fundamentally affecting legal services in the Doha Round. 
1. The regulation of the legal profession, including the regulation of foreign 
lawyers, is uniform neither within the European Union nor within the 
United States. This lack of uniformity has major implications for 
transnational rules on legal services. 
2. An essential rule under the GATS is the requirement of most-favoured-
nation (MFN) treatment. In the absence of an expressly agreed exemption 
from MFN treatment, a WTO Member must accord all other WTO 
Members treatment no less favourable than that accorded the WTO Member 
receiving most-favoured treatment from the WTO Member in question. 
4 See WTO Council for Trade in Services, Background Note, S/C/W /43, at 8 (no. 28). 
5 See the entries for these countries in Martindale-Hubbell International Law Directory (New Providence: 
Martindale-Hubbell/ Lexis, 2002). 
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A. THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Variations in the legal systems of the 15 countries that are members of the 
European Union have been the subject of detailed commentary.6 The§e variations 
account for the protracted negotiations that were necessary until, in 1998, the 
European Union adopted an Establishment Directive in respect of legal services.7 
The 15 EU member countries are required to implement the Directive by 
appropriate national measures.a To the extent that the Directive has been 
implemented, it creates a system under which a duly licensed legal practitioner from 
any EU home country is entitled to establish himself or herself in every other EU 
country. Under the Directive, the practitioner thus established in an EU host country 
is aut~orized, using his or her home-country professional title, · to provide legal 
services relating to home-country, host-country and third-country law. Additionally, 
such a practitioner, after having been established in an EU host country for a certain 
period of time, is entitled to. qualify, at his or her option, as a member of a legal 
profession in the host country. An analogous, although somewhat more qualified, 
right of establishment is also conferred by the Directive on law firms (as distinguished 
from individual lawyers). Here, in many cases, the Directive enables a law firm from 
an EU home member-country to establish itself in EU host member countries. The 
Potential qualifications of this right of establishment relate to (a) possible general 
restrictions in the host country with regard to legal practice by law firms, and (b) 
possible restrictions where the law firm is not entirely controlled by nationals of the 
15 EU member countries.9 
The European Union's Establishment Directive expressly confines the individual 
rights thereunder to nationals of the 15 EU countries. 10 Thus, a legal practitioner from 
a non-EU country, even if he or she qualifies as a member of a legal profession in an 
EU country, is not entitled to the benefits of the Directive. It seems most unlikely that 
this aspect of the Directive will be changed. In theory, the United States might attempt 
to reach a bilateral agreement with the European Union whereby every US national 
Who qualified as a legal practitioner in an EU country would be entitled to the benefits 
of the Directive. Such a bilateral agreement, it might be argued, would be far more 
beneficial to the US legal profession than potential benefits to be attained pursuant to 
the Doha Round. 
There are, however, rather serious impediments to achieving such a bilateral 
result. First, the EU member countries encountered considerable difficulty over a long 
6 E.g., Cone, as note 2 above, chs 7-11. · . 
0 
7 Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 15 February 1998! to facilitate practice 
f the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which qualification was 
0btai~ed, OJ L077 (14 March 1988), at 0036--0047 (hereinafter "EU Directive"). . . . 
E . France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have yet to adopt national legislation 1mplement1ng the 
U Drrectlve; the 11 other EU Member States have adopted such legislation. 1~ The respective provisions of the EU Directive referred to in this paragraph are Articles 2, 5.1, _1~;3, an? l 1. This results from the defimuon oflawyer in Article 1.2(a) of the EU Directive as one who ts a national 
of a Member State". 
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period in negotiating the Establishment D irective just among tbcmsclve , 11 and they 
might lack the political will to embark on the further intra-EU negotiations that would 
be required in order to extend the D irective to non-E U nationals. Second, as discussed 
below, it would probably prove difficult for the United States to put itself in a position 
where it could offer to the European Union advantages for EU legal practitioners 
established in the United States of a type that the European Union would deem a 
suitable counterpart for granting rights under the Directive to US practitioners 
established in the European Union. Finally, as mentioned above, there is the matter of 
MFN treatment, meaning that the European Union and the United States could not 
simply enter into a bilateral agreement without either extending its benefits to all 
WTO Members, or else granting trade concessions that would permit them 
successfully to claim an MFN waiver for legal services in the Doha Round 
negotiations. 
Another bilateral objective that the United States might seek from the European 
Union outside the Doha Round is the repeal of the EU's doctrine under a decision by 
the European Court of Justice, known as the AM&S case, whereby client 
communications to lawyers in the European Union may not benefit from attorney-
client privilege if the lawyers are not qualified EU legal practitioners.12 This distinction 
between EU and non-EU legal practitioners established in the European Union, 
which accords attorney-client privilege in the case of the former but not the latter, and 
thus gives a competitive advantage to the former as compared with the latter, has much 
vexed US law firms established in EU host countries.13 The abolition of this distinction 
could conceivably be the subject of a bilateral arrangement between the United States 
and the European Union. Even so, this limited objective, it might be argued, could 
equally well be dealt with in a multilateral agreement on attorney- client privilege 
entered into in the context of the Doha Round. 
As a practical matter, however, it might prove impractical to focus the many 
participants in the Doha Round in an effective manner on the discriminatory 
implications of the AM&S case, whereas US bar associations are quite focused on this 
issue and are probably well positioned to lobby for it to be dealt with in bilateral EU-
US negotiations. If the United States were successful in such negotiations, the result 
might be unilateral action by the European Union applied generally for the benefit of 
11 See Roger Goebel, lAwyers ill tlte E11ropeat1 Community: Progress Towards Commu11ity-Wide R ights of Practice, 
15 Fordham Int'! L. J. (1991-92), 556; Heinz Weil, The Proposal for a Directive on the R igltt of Establishmetitfor 
lAwyers i11 the E11ropean Comm1111ity, id., at 699; see Cone, as note 2 above, at 8:12- 8:26. 
12
• AM&S Europe Limited v. Commission, Case 155179 (18 May 1982), Common Market R eports §8757. In 
that case the staff of the European Commission, in the course of investigating alleged antitrust violations, had 
requested documents that AM&S Europe Limited had refused to provide on the ground of attorney-client 
privilege involving in- house counsel. The Commission rejected the claim of privilege, and the issue was brought 
before the European Court of Justice which, in dictum, observed that "written communications between lawyer 
and client must apply without distinction to any lawyer entitled to the practice of his profession in one of the 
Member States, regardless of the Member State in which the client lives''. This dictum has been cited as authority 
for the proposition that, in the EU, communications by clients to non-EU lawyers are not privileged. 
13 The ABA House of Delegates, in February 1983, resolved that a client should enjoy the same privilege in 
respect of communications with a US lawyer that the client enjoys in communications with an EU lawyer. 
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non-EU legal practitioners established in the European Union. Thus, while the 
AM&S issue is one that the United States has been pressing and is likely to continue 
to press to have resolved, its resolution in a manner favou~able to non-EU legal 
practitioners would seem to depend on unilateral decisions taken within the 
European Union itself 
Finally, judging from unofficial indications of what the European Union will be 
~eeking in the Doha Round with respect to legal services, its focus may be less on 
unproving access in the United States for EU law firms than on raising the level of 
multilateral commitments in order to gain access for EU law firms in countries with 
restrictive policies on the right of establishment. Korea and other Asian countries, for 
example, and possibly certain Latin American countries, may fall in this category. 14 As 
for the United States, quite a few EU law firms are well established there, especially in 
New York, and some of these establishments are substantial in size .and effectively 
operate as though they were domestic US firms. ts While there are ways in which the 
United States might further penefit EU firms, improvements of this sort may seem 
rather marginal when compared to the lifting of barriers in restrictive jurisdictions 
through multilateral negotiations. 
B. THE UNITED STATES 
The practice of law is regulated by the several states of the United States. Great 
disparity exists among the states as regards the treatment of non-US legal practitioners 
established, or seeking to become established, in a particular US state. In the 
(theoretical) event of bilateral EU- US negotiations on legal services, the United States 
Will perforce need to take these disparities into account and thus might not find it easy 
~o speak in a meaningful way with a single voice on behalf of all of the US states 
including those where protectionist rules apply to the practice oflaw. 
The United States is represented in the Doha Round by the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), which in turn, as regards legal services, looks for guidance to 
the American Bar Association (ABA)-a large, voluntary association of lawyers. In 
anticipation of the Doha Round, the ABA adopted a resolution endorsing its 1993 
0 
14 See documents made . available 17 April 2002 at <http://www.guardian.co.u~/Print/ 
th38S8,4395515,00.html> (providmg 29 non~pubhc European Conmussion documents, designated MD. 040/ 02 
rough MD: 0.68/02 (6 March 2002), settmg out GATS requests from the EU and m Member States to, ~spect1vely, India, Ca?ada, the United Sc:ites, Australia, N ew Zealand, the Philippines, Switzerland, Colom~m, 
B anama, Malaysia, Pakistan, Smgapore, Chma, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea_, Indonesia, Thailand, Argentma, 
S tazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, Egypt, Israel, South Africa, Mextco). With regard to the. Uruted 
tates, there have been suggesttons that all US jurisdictions showd adopt the ABA's Model Rule for the Licensmg ~~Legal Conswtants (August 1993).- See, e.g., Jonathan Goldsnlith, US. doors remain close.d to foreign lawyers, 
lJ ropean Lawyer Gune 2002), .24. Gtven the substantial presence and scope of practice of !ore1gn law firms m _the 
0
t1ted States, examples of wh1ch are referred to in the following footnote, these suggesnons may be susceptible 
m;~rpretation as def~nsive EU posturing for purposes of the Doha Round. . . 
See, e.g., the lisnngs for Allen & Overy, Clifford Chance, Freshfields Bruckhaus Dermger, Lmklaters, ~ells m 12 Martindale-Hubbell I.Aw Directory (New Providence: Martindale-Hubbell/Lexis, 2002) at, respectively, 
C75B-78B, NYC262B-283~, NYC503B-504B, NYC877B-878B, NYC888B-889B. 
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Model Rule on Foreign Legal Consultants. 16 The substantive relevance of this 
endorsement in the context of the Doha Round not being immediately apparent, an 
effort at explaining its relevance is set out in the immediately following paragraphs. 
The ABA Model Rule is a virtual copy of legal-consultant rules which w ere 
originally adopted in the State of N ew York. (The 1993 ABA Model Rule tracks the 
New York legal-consultant rules as adopted in 1974 and subsequently amended.) 
Looked at on the basis ofNew York's legal-consultant rules, the ABA Model Rule can 
be interpreted in light of almost 30 years of experience and jurisprudence developed in 
New York. Viewed in isolation outside New York, however, the ABA Model Rule is 
far less meaningful. Most of the states of the United States do not have any legal-
consultant rules, and most of the US states that have adopted legal-consultant rules 
have not adopted key provisions of the ABA Model Rule. In other words, when the 
ABA Model Rule is compared with the rules of all of the states of the United States, it 
takes on the character not of a model that has been widely followed but of one that is 
largely precatory. 
The "legal consultant" concept was adopted by New York to facilitate granting 
foreign law firms a right of establishment in New York. Thus, lawyers in a foreign law 
firm could be licensed as "legal consultants" without examination (that is, without 
having to qualify as members of the New York Bar) to practice law in New York, and 
this right, combined with (a) the right to associate (as partners or otherwise) with N ew 
York lawyers, and (b) the right to advise on home-country, host-country and third-
country law, constitut~d a meaningful right of establishment for foreign law firms 
located in New York.17 This right is not found in most US states, however, where the 
legal-consultant rules, if any, have not followed the N ew York/ABA Model Rule 
pattern of permitting licensed legal consultants to advise on host-country law and to 
create host-country legal practices. T hus, were bilateral EU- US negotiations to occur, 
the European Union might well question whether the United States was in a position 
16 l\.esolution o f lhe AUA 1 lo us of I) leg:it s, 1::::cbru::.ry 2002, st:aing that lhc ADA "supports neg ti:ition 
proposals co the United States Trade H..eprcsencativc regarding access to fo re ig n nurkeu for U S lawye rs thro ugh 
permanent establishments consistent with, and as expressed and incorporated in, the ABA's 'Model Rule for the 
Licensing of Legal Consultants' in the United States". (The ABA's Model Rule was adopted by the ADA H ouse 
of Delegates in August 1993 and has not been modified. Although 24 US jurisdictions have legal-consultant rules, 
most of them differ materially from the ABA's Model Rule. See Cone, as note 2 above, ch . 4.) See also ABA 
Section of International Law and Practice, Report 113E ro the House of Delegates (3 February 2002). Although, 
at the time this article went to press, the United States had not announced its position on legal services in the 
Doha Round, it is expected that that position will be based on (1) the ABA's Model Rule, and (2) the common 
position of N ew York bar associations referred to in the next footnote. 
17 R.ulcs of the New York Court of Appeals, Part 521. On the basis of these rules and over 28 years of 
experience thereunder, the New York State Bar Association and the Association of the Dar of the C ity of New 
York, in April 2002, adopted a common position on the Doha Round negotiations on legal services. Briefly, this 
common position called for a multilateral right of establishment in host countries for lawyers and law firms from 
home countries, entitling the establishment (1) to comprise home-country, host-country and third-country 
lawyers, and (2) to supply legal services (a) which the lawyer or law firm was entitled to supply in the home 
country, and (b) relating to the law of the host country if, where appropriate, the services were based on the 
services of host-country lawyers who could be lawyers within the establishment itself. This common position was 
endorsed by the Legal Services Committee of a US trade group, the Coalition of Service Industries. For this 
common position, see Sydney M. Cone III, New York and Legal Services in N egotiations Under the General Agreement 
011 Trade in Services (Geneva, 19 July 2002; on file with the WTO Secretariat) . 
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to grant EU law firms a meaningful right of establishment throughout the United 
States. More precisely, the European Union might question the breadth of the 
mandate ertjoyed by the USTR in the area oflegal services. 
Three other aspects of the US position in such hypothetical bilateral negotiations 
should be mentioned: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Even in New York and in the ABA Model Rule, there are limitations on the 
rights of legal consultants that, in the age 'of the Doha Round, may seem 
antiquated. Legal consultants in New York are subject not only to restrictions 
involving appearances in that state's courts, which must be the active 
responsibility of members of the New York bar or of lawyers specially 
admitted by the court, but also to restrictions involving (1) transfers of title to 
real property in New York, (2) family law matters relating to US citizens, and 
(3) the preparation of documents in New York governing inheritance under 
New York law by US citizens.18 These last three restrictions were deemed 
politically necessary . some 30 years ago in order to deal with protectionist 
opposition to the adoption of New York's legal-consultant rules. Other US 
states have copied these restrictions and, in a number of cases, have added to 
them. Perhaps the New York restrictions are so entrenched and are so limited 
in nature that they have become immutable. Their retention, however, might 
provide the European Union with negotiating points in the event bilateral 
EU-US negotiations on legal services were to occur. 
In 2001, New York adopted rules on multidisciplinary practice (MDP) that 
limit MDP in New York to contractual arrangements between lawyers and 
certain non-legal professionals, and that forbid the latter to have an ownership 
or investment interest in, or otherwise to control, a legal practice in New 
York.19 In certain EU countries, however, MDP. is not subject to these 
strictures. It is conceivable, therefore, that issues relating to MDP could 
complicate bilateral negotiations between the European Union and the 
United States on legal services, although it seems more likely that rules on 
MDP would be excluded from such negotiations and left to the discretion of 
local regulatory authorities. 
The states of the United States are just beginning to develop rules on 
multijurisdictional practice (MJP) among the several US states. In August 
2002, the ABA adopted a resolution on MJP which, so far as non-US law 
18 Id., § 521.3. 
19 New York Lawyer's Code of Professional R esponsibilitv Disciplinary Rules 1- 106, 1- 107. For the 
relev b k d .,, · F' S ant ac groun ~eport, see N ew York State Bar Association Committee on the Law _Goverrung irm Mtru~turi: ~nd Oper~tlo?, Report on Preserving tire Core Uilues of tire American Legal Profession: The Place of 
S ultidisaplmary Practice m tire Law Governing Lawyers (April 2000). For subsequent US Federa! _law, see the A~banes-Oxley Act of2002, § 2_01(a), adding, inter a/ia, new§ (g)(S) to Section 10A of the S~cunues Exchange 
on t of 1934. In the European Uruon, the European Court of Justice has held that rules adopted m th~ Netherlands 
of MOP, rules which are not dissurular fro~ the New York Rules on MDP, are not incompatible with the Treaty 
Or Rome. J CJ. VV<>uters,]. W. Savelberglr, Pnce Waterhouse Belastingadvise1m B V v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse 
de van Advocaten, EC] C-309(99 (19 February 2002). 
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firms are concerned, does little except, once again, commend the 1993 ABA 
Model Rule on Legal Consultants to the attention of the several US states 
and, in addition, suggest that they look favourably on temporary "fly-in, fly-
out" visits by foreign lawyers. By itself, the ABA resolution on MJP does little 
to promote the right of establishment of foreign law firms in the United 
States, and this factor might not escape.the attention of EU negotiators in the 
event of bilateral EU-US negotiations on legal services. 20 
In sum, bilateral EU-US negotiations on legal services would appear to be a 
problematic substitute for the multilateral Doha Round. Even so, many of the 
considerations set forth above relating to hypothetical bilateral EU-US negotiations are 
hardly irrelevant in the multilateral context and may manifest themselves, directly or 
indirectly, in the course of the Doha Round. Because law firms from the European 
Union and the United States are predominant in seeking rights of establishment and 
because international legal centres in those two countries tend ~o set the pace as regards 
granting rights of establishment to law firms from other home countries, EU-US 
interaction on legal services, even if they do not ripen into formal bilateral negotiations 
as such, may prove to have a significant influence on how the Doha negotiations in 
fact proceed. 
Ill. LEGAL SER VICES AND ATTITUDES TOWARD GLOBALIZATION 
The predominance of the European Union and the United States in the area of 
legal services rather predictably gives rise to arguments that have become familiar in a 
more general setting with respect to globalization and the WTO. Detractors of the 
WTO often claim that it is a creature of multinational enterprises reaping the benefits 
of globalization primarily for industrialized nations.21 With regard to the GATS, its 
critics have suggested that its principal beneficiaries are major providers of services 
based in industrialized countries, seeking access to markets in developing countries in 
order to keep the latter in a state of economic subordination. 22 The undeniable fact 
that law firms with global ambitions and capabilities are to a great extent based in 
industrialized nations makes it superficially tempting to include legal services among 
the services claimed to be part of an effort to exploit the GA TS for the benefit of more 
industrialized countries seeking expansion if not domination in countries that are less 
industrialized. 
It should be recognized, however, that the role of law firms, even of global law 
firms, as facilitators of globalization, is rather different from the role of the clients of 
20 The substance of the ABA position on MJP is found in Report ef the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice 
(ABA, August 2002). ~ 
21 See, e.g., articles posted on <http://www.prospect.org/issue_pages/ globalization/> esp. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Globalism1 Discontents. See also Center for R esearch on Globalization: <http:/ / www.globalresearch.ca/>. 
22 See, e.g., Jeff Faux, A Deal Built on Sand, 111e WT01 Recent Doha Meeting is a Fast Track to Chaos: <http:/ 
/ www.prospect.org/ print/ Vl 3/ 1 / faux-j.html>. 
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law firms. It is the clients that constitute the business, commercial and financial engines 
of globalization. Their economic muscle is the driving force that has wrought a 
globalized economy. To the extent that they need lawyers to facilitate their activities 
they will find them, whether in home countries or host countries or third countries, 
whether by retaining firms of lawyers or by hiring individual practitioners or by 
creating corporate in-house teams of lawyers. True, once a governmental authority or 
a non-governmental organization or a private enterprise concludes that the net effect 
of globalization is harmful or pernicious, it (the opponent of globalization) will 
probably be inclined to reason that there is no compelling reason to distinguish 
between clients and their lawyers. This may seem a mighty fine distinction in the mind 
of a person for whom globalization poses a threat that must be tempered or avoided. 
Failure to make this distinction may serve, however, to mask the essentially 
protectionist agenda of a number of opponents of rights of establishment for law firms 
from other countries. The primary effect of denying this right to foreign law firms is 
not to stem the progress of globalization-it indeed may have scant effect on the forces 
of globalization-but to shelter domestic legal practitioners from competition. The 
practice of law is highly competitive, particularly where the clients are engaged in 
global business, commerce or finance. Here, the typical lawyer-client relationship is 
?ne in which the lawyer is the supplicant, the anxious caretaker of the relationship, and 
in which the client is quite free to choose among potential suppliers of legal services. 
Clients, moreover, stand to benefit when they are able to choose among a broad 
sp_ectrum of potential suppliers, domestic and foreign. It is the local bar, not the local 
client, that is likely to sound the alarm that foreign lawyers are coming, to decry the 
consequences of globalization for national culture, and to insist that the intruders be 
repulsed or, at least, tightly controlled. 
This protectionist phenomenon in the area of legal practice is not uniquely a 
function of attitudes toward globalization, and protectionism in the legal profession is 
not confined to jurisdictions in the less-industrialized world.23 Certain member 
countries of the European Union and certain states of the United States have rules that 
effectively restrain competition by establishments of foreign lawyers. This type of 
parochialism antedated the era of globalization, and is a useful indicator of the nature of 
some of the forces at work when a local bar raises the threat of globalization as a reason 
for erecting barriers against the creation of meaningful rights of establishment for law 
finns from other countries. 
It should also be recognized that the exclusion of foreign law firms from a 
Particular jurisdiction may be self-defeating. The professional skills that clients seek in 
major cross-border transactions may tend to gravitate toward centres of international 
Practice in other jurisdictions, and legal work relating to the protectionist jurisdic~ion 
rnay in fact be done in such a centre in another jurisdiction. This result could handicap 
the development of the legal profession in the protectionist jurisdiction, and effectively 
2
' See Cone, as note 2 above, at 1: 16-17, 1 :20. 
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cause an outflow of legal work to localities that afford a right of establishment to 
foreign firms and that thereby receive the professional stimulus of competition among 
a variety of firms. 
In addition, it should be recognized that domestic professional organizations may 
lack the political power to maintain protectionist policies over a long period. Clients 
seeking the benefits of a multiplicity of providers of legal services may become 
impatient with local bar groups attempting to curtail competition, and governments 
may find that, in the interests of clients and in the context of multilateral trade 
negotiations, it is desirable or at least expedient to provide greater cross-border access 
to establishments of law firms from other countries. 
All of this said, it cannot be denied that an observer who begins the Doha Round 
with an anti-globalization perspective is likely to include legal services in the category 
of services that should be denied new opportunities for expansion. Such an observer 
will almost certainly notice that the strongest promoters of new opportunities for the 
expansion oflegal services in the Doha Round are law firms whose home countries are 
among the world's more industrialized nations. It would therefore seem predictable 
that anti-globalization forces will react by resisting the creation of robust rights of 
establishment for these firms. 
IV. THE PROPOSED ABSTRACTION OF LEGAL SER VICES IN THE DOHA ROUND INTO 
FORMAL CATEGORIES 
The suggestion has been made by Australia24 and by the International Bar 
Association25 that legal services in the Doha Round might be usefully analysed by 
abstracting them into formal categories of legal practice and the regulation of legal 
practice. This intellectual exercise, it is said, will enable WTO Members, in dealing 
with legal services under the GA TS, to categorize different types of legal services and 
regulatory systems and, having done so, to ascertain rather readily the areas in which 
they may be prepared to make specific commitments. For example, it might be argued 
that, if a WTO Member were willing to license foreign lawyers as legal consultants 
authorized to advise on home-country (but not host-country) law, that a M ember, 
through a process of abstraction, would readily find the vocabulary that is appropriate 
for a specific commitment to that formal category oflegal services. 
Well intentioned though this approach might be, its practical effect might not 
prove very helpful if the objective of the Doha Round in respect oflegal services is to 
move WTO Members toward less restrictive regimes through the creation and 
recognition of meaningful cross-border rights of establishment for lawyers and law 
24 WTO, Council for Trade in Services Special Session, Commrmicationfrom Australia-Negotiatillg ProposalfQ! 
Legal Services, Doc S/ CSS/ W /67 (28 March 2001), supplemented and revised by Suppl. 1/Rev. 1 (10 July 2001). 
25 International Bar Association, Legal Services Under CATS, Briefing Paper for the WTO (Geneva, 19 July 
2002). See also Russell Miller and Scott Gallacher, The CATS Framework and Trade in Professional (Legal) Services, 
paper presented at 24th International Trade Law Conference, Canberra, Australia, 9 October 2002. 
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finns. Indeed, the practical effect could easily be regressive where the terminology of 
decontextualization was employed to camouflage protectionist measures. An all-too-
Possible result is that host-country protectionist interests will be assisted in refining 
their opposition to meaningful cross-border rights of establishment for law firms from 
other countries, and that the fruits of decontextualization will be a menu of 
opportunism from which protectionist interests in various countries will pick and 
choose those aspects of legal practice concerning which they are, and, more to the 
point, are not, prepared to facilitate rights of establishment. As regards the example 
rnentioned above, a WTO Member that decides to license legal consultants and to 
authorize them to advise on home-country (but not host-country) law does not need 
an abstract developed elsewhere in order to do so. In taking such a step, the member 
~eeds only its own parochial policy reasons for doing so, and its own regulatory and 
Jurisprudential setting for finding the means of doing' so effectively.26 
Decontextualization is of questionable utility by virtue of two fundamental 
characteristics of legal-service negotiations: 
the essential issues are few in number and simple in concept, and are not 
clarified by formalistic abstraction; 
when these issues are dealt with in real terms, they are dealt with locally on the 
basis of local arrangements locally arrived at. 
The second of these characteristics rather basically informs the first. Local issues 
are rarely expressed in abstracted GA TS-speak. Being, at bottom, issues arising under 
local rules whose language is that of the relevant locality and whose meaning is to be 
found in large part in local history and jurisprudence, they require an exercise 
altogether different from that of formalistic reference to abstract categories. Rather 
than create the artifice of a universal menu of regulatory terminology, the legal-service 
negotiators would be well advised to undertake the painstaking task of loo kin~ at _the 
regulation oflegal services one jurisdiction at a time, in the actual, individual, histoncal 
and jurisprudential framework of each jurisdiction. Only in this manner can the 
negotiators obtain an understanding of how the regulation of legal services actually 
operates. 
There are certainly issues that can be identified as commonly arising in host 
jurisdictions; but (as mentioned above) they tend to be few in number and simple in 
concept. They relate to rights of establishment for foreign lawyers and law firms in the 
relevant host country, and, in this context, usually can be reduced to the right of a~ 
establishment to provide legal services involving the law of the host country· Once this 
. 
26 The Australian effort at decontextualization (see note 24 above) is generally favourable to liberalizing trade ~legal services, but it nonetheless would (i) prevent the Australian establishments of non-Australian law firmJ 
.. m advising on Australian law on the basis of advice given by Australian lawyers within those establishments, an f ~u) require such establishments to refer to Australian law firms all matters involving Australian law. See § 13 0 
b uppl. 1/Rev: 1, cited in note ~4 above_(~dvice given by a foreign practitioner on Australian law must be ~xl're~sl{s 
fi ased c;m advice by an Australian pract1ttoner not employed by the foreign practmoner). No such resmctto 
):;und m the ABA Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal Consultants, see§ 4(e) thereof, or Part 521 of the New 
Ork Rules, see§ 521.3(e) ther~of, referred to in notes 16 and 17 above. 
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simple issue has been recognized and used as the touchstone for a given jurisdiction, 
decontextualized abstraction can be dispensed with, and negotiations can proceed 
efficiently. 
This issue often subsumes an establishment's permitted scope of practice, and the 
right of association enjoyed by, or denied, the legal professionals within the 
establishment. Scope of practice invariably comes down to rules that permit or forbid 
non-host-country lawyers to provide legal services involving the law of the host 
country. Right of association invariably has its nexus in the ability of host-country, 
home-country and third-country lawyers to associate within the establishment. More 
precisely, are they entitled (1) to become partners in or employees of non-host-
country lawyers and firms having establishments in the host country, and (2) as 
members of the legal staff of such an establishment, freely to provide legal services in 
their capacity as host-country legal professionals? 
Other issues of potential importance are the right of the establishment to practice 
under its home-country name, the legal form that the establishment may take, and the 
right of home-country lawyers to use their home-country titles. These issues seem to 
create obstacles, however, only in countries that are restrictive in regard to scope of 
practice and right of association. In other words, such questions as those of firm name, 
legal form, and the title to be used by home-country lawyers seem to be troublesome 
only in jurisdictions that are otherwise restrictive in regulating the right of 
establishment, and may be little more than somewhat gratuitous topics seized upon in 
those jurisdictions in order further to qualify the right of establishment. 
It might be added that, universally, host-country establishments are subjected to 
the professional disciplinary rules applicable to domestic lawyers and firms in the host 
country. In a sense, this regulatory feature serves to ratify the host country's 
commitment to rights of establishment for lawyers and firms from other countries, 
because it places them on a professional footing identical to that of domestic lawyers 
and firms in the host country. Only where the rules are significantly harsher for 
establishments of foreign firms than for the domestic profession do they put in question 
the host country's genuine commitment to rights of establishment. 
Jurisdictions aspiring to the status of major centres of international practice are 
likely to adopt rules favourable to non-host-country firms with host-country 
establishments seeking to render legal services involving host-country law. It will 
follow that rules on scope of practice and on rights of association will be shaped in a 
manner permitting these establishments to supply such services. It will also follow that 
rules on other topics will avoid gratuitous restrictions of a formal or procedural nature. 
In contrast, jurisdictions prey to local protectionist interests are likely to shape 
their rules so as to inhibit competition by establishments of lawyers and law firms 
having home countries other than the host country. The protectionist phenomenon~ 
may take many forms, but the protectionist motive is not hard to identify, and where it 
prevails in multilateral trade negotiations such as the Doha Round, the invariable 
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upshot is a refusal to make specific commitments on legal services that are favourable to 
~stab_lishments entitled to render legal services involving host-country law. The picture 
IS essentially that simple, and it seems unlikely to become more limpid when viewed 
through a patina of decontextualized terminology. ~ 
V. GATS ALTERNATIVES TO SPECIFIC C OMMITMENTS ON LEGAL SERVICES 
Ordinarily, WTO Members negotiating with regard to services under the GATS 
~so negotiate with regard to non-GA TS items (industrial goods, agricultural products, 
Intellectual property, trade policies) included in (to take the current example) the Doha 
Roun'd. Trade-offs between Members with regard to unrelated items may therefore 
occur. Accordingly, the importance assumed by legal services may be measured by its 
Utility as a trade-off in other areas (which need not necessarily involve services at all). 
Thus measured, legal services may be of relatively minor importance in the Doha 
Round. As a result, there quite possibly will be several WTO Members that make no 
specific commitments in respect of legal services, or whose specific commitments on 
legal services represent less than vigorous efforts to facilitate host-member rights of 
establishment for lawyers and law firms from other WTO home members. Such, at any 
rate, was the experience in the Uruguay Round. 
Under the GATS, there are potential alternatives to the scheduling of specific 
commitments on legal services by WTO Members. One alternative is to treat the legal 
Profession as a "discipline" in respect of which Members who are so inclined will 
rnutually agree on specified professional rules and standards. As long as a mutual-
recognition agreement is open to all Members willing to adhere to it, it has legitimacy 
under the GATS.27 Not inconceivably, the Doha Round will be the occasion for 
~eveloping such a mutual-recognition agreement on legal services. Experience to date 
IS not extremely encouraging, however, and suggests either that efforts to reach such an 
agreement will be less vigorous than negotiations for full-blown specific commitments 
~y WTO Members; or that, if they produce such an agreement, it will be one phrased 
in terms of generalities that put to one side the hard regulatory questions affecting 
cross-border legal practice. 28 
One requirement under the GATS is that every WTO Member must make it 
Possible for legal professionals from other WTO Members to requalify as legal 
Professionals in the Member State in question.29 Thus, in a given WTO Member, 
there must exist procedures whereby legal professionals from all other WTO 
Members can become candidates entitled to qualify for the legal profession of the 
\VTo Member in question. This is a rather minimalist requirement, forbidding a 
restriction based solely on nationality. Hence, it is legitimate for requalification to 
27 GATS Article VII. 
I 28 See International Bar Association, CATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services, a handbook (London: 
nternational Bar Association, May 2002), at p. 35. 
29 GATS Article VI(6). 
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subject candidates from other WTO Members, even when they are already qualified 
legal professionals, to the same requirements imposed on nationals of the WTO 
Member in question who are not qualified legal professionals. These requalification 
requirements may involve educational prerequisites, examinations, and linguistic 
facility that, singly or cumulatively, are not easily coped with by candidates from 
other countries, and that may prove irksome for those legal professionals who have 
years of experience as duly licensed legal practitioners. 
It is possible that the subject of requalification by legal professionals will be 
discussed in the Doha Round, and that an effort will be made to remove some of the 
more irksome strictures imposed in various WTO Members. As a general matter, those 
WTO Members that tend to favour a meaningful right of establishment for lawyers 
and law firms from other countries also tend to make requalification relatively 
accessible. Where the right of establishment is the subject of favourable rules, 
requalification is likely, also, to be the subject of favourable rules.30 As a consequence, 
multilateral negotiations on requalification may not prove to be a useful substitute for 
negotiations on the right of establishment. Indeed, the opposite may be true, and it 
may turn out that progress in the area of requalification will follow once significant 
results have been obtained in multilateral negotiations on the right of establishment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Through a process of elimination and after the various arguments have been 
weighed, a tentative conclusion, which may provide the basis for a more definitive 
conclusion as the Doha Round unfolds, can be reached at this stage, to the effect that 
legal services have been properly included in the Doha Round. The weighing of 
arguments will be found below. The process of elimination takes account of the four 
topics discussed above, and does so in the following manner. 
When compared with other WTO Members, the European Union and the 
United States are in a class by themselves, both as host-member users of legal 
services supplied by establishments of law firms from other WTO Members, 
and as the creators of legal-service establishments in other host members. 
Much of their predominance as both users and creators of such establishments 
rests on the many EU legal-service establishments in the United States, and the 
many US legal-service establishments in the European Union. It might 
therefore be tempting for the European Union and the United States to 
exploit their predominance by undertaking bilateral negotiations instead of 
participating in the multilateral Doha Round. Such a bilateral approach does 
not appear particularly promising, however, upon examination of (a) the 
30 E.g., Qualified Lawyers Transfer Regulations 1990 governing the qualification of foreign lawyers as English 
solicitors; § 520.6 of the Rules of the N ew York Court of Appeals, enabling foreign-educated lawyers to take the 
N ew York State Bar Examination. 
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disparate regulatory systems for legal services in each of the European Union 
and the United States, (b) the somewhat limited bilateral concessions that each 
of them might reasonably expect from the other, and (c) the concessions 
involving rights of establishment that each of them may be seeking in, for 
example, Asia and Latin America. With regard to the last point, there is the 
further consideration that, under the GATS, bilateral concessions would have 
to be extended to other WTO Members (such as those in Asia and Latin 
America) on an MFN basis, unless WTO Members agreed to exempt the EU-
US bilateral concessions from MFN treatment. These considerations strongly 
suggest that, although the European Union and the United States are 
unquestionably predominant with regard to legal services, their interests would 
be better served by the Doha Round than by any bilateral arrangement within 
the realm of feasibility. 
It can be expected that the predominance of the European Union and the 
United States in the area of legal services will provoke a negative reaction in 
the Doha Round from WTO Members that question the consequences of 
globalization for countries that are relatively non-industrialized. Whatever the 
logic underlying this anti-globalization factor, particularly with regard to legal 
services, it may represent a constant to be reckoned with in the Doha Round. 
One way to reckon with it, of course, would be to exclude legal services from 
the Doha Round. The basic thrust of arguments against globalization have 
relatively little to do with legal services, however, as compared with other 
topics of far greater economic importance being negotiated in the Doha 
Round, an_d it therefore would seem altogether out of proportion to single out 
legal services for exclusion. Inasmuch as issues relating to globalization 
transcend the questions that will require resolution in the legal-service 
negotiations, it would seem that those issues can be reasonably put to one side 
in the strict context of the legal-service negotiations. . 
Efforts to adopt an abstract of decontextualized terminology through which 
the legal-services negotiations will find expression seem unlikely to advance 
the objective of promoting cross-border rights of establishment for law firms 
in WTO home-member countries. The essence of a right of establishment 
must originate not from above through a GATS-wide terminological 
superstructure, but from below, jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction, through local 
decisions grounded in local experience and jurisprudence. Similarly, 
protectionist policies inimical to such a right of establishment are of parochial 
origin, and the proposed terminology can equally well be used by local 
interests to mask protectionist objectives. This being said, it seems unlikely that 
an otherwise propitious round of multilateral negotiations on legal services will 
founder by virtue of a proposed terminological superstructure. The lesson to 
be learned, it w<:mld seem, is not that the round should be abandoned, but 
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that, in pursuing it, the participants should remain especially aware of the 
parochial underpinnings of the topic being dealt with. 
In the area of legal services, the GATS provides for possible alternatives to a 
round of negotiations ending with schedules of specific commitments. Those 
WTO Members that are so inclined might instead attempt to produce a 
mutual-recognition agreement, or a similar understanding, setting out certain 
rules and standards relating to the practice of law. Past experience seems to 
suggest, however, that this type of approach tends to produce rather vague 
generalities which, when all is said and done, do not compare favourably with 
multilateral negotiations for schedules of specific commitments. Although the 
latter may be spotty, yielding only a patchwork of rights of establishment, these 
rights, once in place, are reinforced by the contractual framework of the 
GATS, and by the institutional and dispute-resolution resources of the WTO. 
The principal argument against incluiling legal services in the Doha Round is that 
they are fundamentally parochial, deeply rooted in variegated systems of legal 
education, legal values, juridical oversight, professional rules, and cultural attitudes; and 
that the GATS is ill-suited to dealing with this heterodoxy of jurisprudential 
parochialisms. The principal argument for including legal services in the Doha Round 
is that, notwithstaniling the argument summarized in the preceding sentence, legal 
services were included in the Uruguay Round and were there the subject of several 
specific commitments. Admittedly, those commitments, taken together and viewed in 
the context of the many WTO Members that did little or nothing in the way of 
making legal-service commitments, were rather limited. The Uruguay Round 
nonetheless represented a tangible beginning in the area of legal services; and a failure 
to follow up in the Doha Round could rightly be viewed as a step backward, as 
abandoning cross-border rights of establishment to the risks and vagaries of out- and-
out protectionism. 
In the end, protectionism-the threat of protectionist barriers to cross-border 
rights of establishment-seems to hold the key to the question of whether legal 
services should be included in or excluded from the Doha Round. The argument for 
exclusion is that the GA TS, while an agreement aimed at eliminating protectionist 
barriers, is not well suited to the parochial problems and features encountered when 
dealing with rules on the supply of legal services. In brief, it can be argued that legal 
services fit but awkwardly in the GATS, and the GATS must be tortured more than a 
little to fit around legal services. 
Once this poor fit has been recognized, explicated and regretted, the fact remains 
that protectionism is the enemy of cross-border rights of establishment. This being 
true, it would seem altogether desirable also to recognize that the GA TS as a WTO 
core agreement represents a vital multilateral force designed to roll back protectionism. 
It would be a bit much to expect the WTO and the GA TS to be perfectly designed for 
every individual category of business and professional services, much less for so eclectic 
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a sub-subcategory as legal services. Despite the imperfections that must be dealt with 
when legal services are fitted into the Doha Round, that is, into the current round of 
WTo negotiations, and into the applicable WTO agreement, that is, the GA TS, 
proponents of cross-border rights of establishment would seem well advised to think 
themselves fortunate that the WTO and the GATS exist, and, accordingly, to try to 
make the most of the opportunities inherent in the Doha Round. 
